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This study presents new homogenous series of top income shares in Sweden over the period 
1903 to 2004. We find that, starting from higher levels of inequality than in other Western 
countries, the income share of the Swedish top decile drops sharply over the first eighty years 
of the century. The fall is almost entirely due to a dramatic drop in the top percentile, while 
the lower half of the top decile experiences virtually no change over this period. Most of the 
decrease takes place before the expansion of the welfare state, in fact, by 1950 Swedish top 
income shares were already lower than in other countries. In the past decades the Swedish top 
income shares developed very differently depending on whether capital gains are included or 
not. Including them, Sweden’s experience resembles that in the U.S. and the U.K. with sharp 
increases in top incomes, whereas excluding them Sweden looks more like the Continental 
European countries where top income shares have remained relatively constant. A possible 
interpretation of our results is that Sweden over the past 20 years has become a country where 
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1  Introduction 
The evolution of income inequality across different economic systems has received enormous 
attention. A key issue in the literature has been the possible trade-offs between egalitarian 
ambitions and incentive effects. It is not surprising therefore that Sweden, allegedly the most 
extensive welfare state, has been the object of a very large number of studies concerning in-
come distribution. The achievements of the Swedish welfare state are well known.
1 However, 
due to the lack of available micro data sets, most recent studies on income distribution have 
not gone further back than to 1967.
2 This means that even though we can document achieve-
ments of the welfare state over the past decades, we can not really put these in historical per-
spective. We do not know to what extent the equal distribution of income in Sweden is mainly 
the outcome of the growth of the welfare state, or if Sweden perhaps has a history of being an 
egalitarian society.  
 
The lack of homogenous, good quality long run series of income inequality has been a general 
shortcoming until recently when, following the work by Piketty (2001, 2003), Piketty and 
Saez (2003), and Atkinson (2004) a number of studies for various countries have constructed 
long run series of income concentration using a common methodology.
3 Extending the classic 
studies by Kuznets (1953, 1955) series on top income shares have been calculated using his-
torical tax statistics. These studies have given a number of important new insights into the 
long run development of income inequality and also found common developments across 
groups of countries. In particular, while most Western countries experience dramatic drops in 
top income shares over the first half of the twentieth century, there seems to be important dif-
                                                 
1 See Lindbeck (1997) for an overview; Atkinson, Rainwater and Smeeding (1995), and Gottshalk and Smeeding 
(1997) for Swedish income distribution in international perspective; and, e.g. Björklund and Freeman (2006) for 
a recent overview of income equalization in Sweden. 
2 An exception is Björklund and Palme (2000) who study the Swedish income distribution on decile level during 
four points in time between 1951 and 1973. Most studies that have analyzed the historical Swedish income dis-
tribution of Sweden have looked at shorter sub-periods, using different methodologies and data sources ruling 
out the construction of homogenous long-run inequality series. Examples include; Spånt (1979) who studied 
mainly Census data for the period 1920–1976, as did Lydall (1968) for the period 1920–1960; Gustafsson and 
Johansson (2003) who study tax returns for five separate years during 1925–1958, but only for people living in 
the City of Gothenburg; Söderberg (1991) who study salaries in various sectors between 1870 and 1950; Lind-
strand (1949) study the period 1935–1947 and Quensel (1944) the period 1930–1941, both using tax return data, 
etc. Bentzel’s (1953) study of the period 1930–1948 is closest to ours in methodology. See Roine and Walden-
ström (2006) for a more complete listing. 
3 Other recent studies include Australia (Atkinson and Leigh, 2006), Canada (Saez and Veall, 2005), Germany 
(Dell, 2005), Ireland (Nolan, 2005), Japan (Moriguchi and Saez, 2005), the Netherlands (Atkinson and Salverda, 
2005), New Zealand (Atkinson and Leigh, 2005), Spain (Alvaredo and Saez 2005) and Switzerland (Dell, 
Piketty and Saez, 2006). Lindert (2000) and Morrison (2000) provide surveys of previous work. 
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ferences between Anglo-Saxon countries and continental European countries over the past 30 
years (see, e.g., Piketty and Saez, 2006).   
 
This paper makes two main contributions. First, it sheds new light on the evolution of income 
inequality in Sweden over the twentieth century. Using the methodology developed in Piketty 
(2001), we provide new homogenous series on top income shares in Sweden, starting at the 
time of the introduction of the modern tax system in 1902 until today. In 1902 Sweden was 
still in a phase of industrialization, had not yet extended the franchise to all male citizens, and 
was still half a century away from the expansion of the Welfare State. Our series, hence, al-
lows us to study changes in income concentration over a period during which Swedish society 
has undergone major structural change. Our series also allow us to put more recent develop-
ments in historical perspective. Furthermore, the fact that we can decompose income shares 
with respect to the source of income, as well as study smaller fractiles within the top of the 
distribution (from the top 10 percent up to the top 0.01 percent), makes it possible for us to 
discriminate between the possible economic mechanisms that could explain our findings.
4 We 
also study changes in wealth concentration and in particular wealth distribution by income 
class. Second, our study is the first in the recent literature on top income and wealth inequality 
to study one of the extremes among what Esping-Andersen (1990) denotes “the different 
worlds of welfare capitalism”, namely the social democratic welfare state.
5 As mentioned 
above, previous studies have given numerous new insights to changes in income concentra-
tion and in particular noted common developments for Anglo-Saxon countries, on the one 
hand, and continental European countries, on the other. We will compare our series for Swe-
den to comparable data for other countries and as we will show, Sweden is indeed different 
from both these groups, although not entirely in ways which may have been expected. 
 
A number of broad facts stand out from our series. Over the first eighty years of the twentieth 
century top income shares in Sweden decreased. Most of this decrease happened during the 
                                                 
4 Previous work on income inequality in Sweden has mainly focused on issues where overall distribution meas-
ures (such as declile ratios or the Gini coefficient) are most relevant and therefore not been concerned with de-
tails of the composition and distribution within the top share. However, the top decile is a very heterogeneous 
group and theories attempting to explain changes in top income shares may be very different if they focus on, for 
example, high wages rather than capital income. It is therefore important to know details about top incomes to be 
able to evaluate different theories.  
5 In his distinction between “The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism”, Esping-Andersen (1990) identifies three 
different types of welfare states; “liberal welfare states” (e.g. the U.S. and the U.K.), the “corporatist-
conservative welfare states” (e.g. France, Germany, Italy) and the “social democratic welfare states”. A similar 
distinction is often made between an Anglo-Saxon, a Continental European, and a Scandinavian group of coun-
tries; see e.g. Lindbeck (2006).    4
first half of the century, that is, before the expansion of the Welfare State, and most of it was 
due to large falls in the income share of the top percentile (P99–100). By contrast, the income 
share going to the lower half of the top decile (P90–P95), which consists mainly of wages, has 
been remarkably stable over the entire period. Between 1903 and 2004 this share has fluctu-
ated between 9 and 11 percent, while the top percentile has changed by a factor of 4. This 
suggests that decomposing the top decile into smaller fractions is crucial for understanding the 
development. In terms of composition, most of the early decrease seems to have been driven 
by falls in capital income, but after around the mid-1930s wage compression also becomes 
important in explaining the decreasing top shares. The drops in capital shares fit well with 
sharp decreases in top wealth shares during the first half of the century, in particular in the 
years just after World War I and in the early 1930s, but notably not during World War II, as 
was the case in many other countries. Between 1950 and 1980 the continued decrease in ine-
quality was quite steady but smaller relative to the first half of the century. Over the past two 
decades the general picture turns out to depend crucially on how capital gains income is 
treated. If we include capital gains, Swedish income inequality has increased quite substan-
tially; when excluding it top income shares seem relatively stable. This indicates that there has 
been no dramatic wage dispersion in Sweden over the past decades, but at the same time, the 
gains from exceptionally large increases in asset prices (mainly increases in share prices) have 
been very unevenly distributed.
6 This, in turn, suggests that the Swedish case over the past 
decades is different from both the Anglo-Saxon case as well as from the Continental Euro-
pean case previously identified in the literature.
7  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we discuss the data and 
methodology used, in Section 3 we present our main findings three two sub-headings; first we 
account for the evolution of top income shares in terms of gross income from all sources 
(separating series including and excluding capital gains), second we study the composition of 
these shares by source, and third we study separate top income series when excluding taxable 
transfers giving us an income concept closer to market income.
8 Thereafter we attempt to ac-
                                                 
6 Our data suggests that these capital gains have accrued to those who also have the highest wages, hence magni-
fying inequalities in the income distribution. 
7 See, for example, Saez (2004) and Piketty and Saez (2006) for overviews of comparisons between different 
countries. 
8 For most other countries this distinction is not very important when studying top incomes, but in the Swedish 
context (taxable) social transfers are sufficiently large to have an effect on the top income shares, even if they do 
not make up any large part of top incomes, as including them affects the reference total for income (see, for 
example, Björklund and Freeman (2006) on the importance of transfers for income distribution in Sweden). All   5
count for our results in Section 4 by studying changes in factor shares, the wealth distribution, 
tax progressivity, and changes in asset prices. We also address the question of what our series 
suggest regarding the Kuznets hypothesis. In Section 5 we highlight differences and similari-
ties in our results for Sweden with the findings in a number of other countries for which com-
parable data exist. Section 6 concludes.  
2  Methodology and Data 
In recent years, a methodology for studying income concentration using long time series of 
tax return data has been established following Piketty (2001), who in turn builds on the semi-
nal work by Kuznets (1953). The basic idea is to construct shares of total personal income 
received by different fractiles of the entire (tax) population, had everyone been required to file 
taxes. Since historically only top income earners were taxed they are the only ones directly 
observed over the entire period. This in turn means that the reference totals for population and 
income, which are aimed at also including non-filing people and their incomes, must be con-
structed using aggregate sources from the population statistics and national accounts. Top 
income shares are then computed by dividing the number of tax units in the top, and their in-
comes, with the reference tax population and reference total income.
9 Assuming that top in-
comes are approximately Pareto distributed, standard inter- and extrapolation techniques can 
be used to calculate the income shares for various top fractiles, such as the top 10 percent 
(P90–100) or the top 0.01 percent (P99.99–100). 
 
Our data on income distribution come from the official Swedish income statistics, which pro-
vides tabulations of the number of taxpayers and their total assessed income for a large num-
ber of income brackets. These tables also typically include information on the different 
sources of income (e.g., wages and capital income), tax liabilities, and even data on net per-
                                                                                                                                                         
details of the series as well as various robustness checks have been placed in a separate working paper, Roine 
and Waldenström (2006). 
9 There are, of course, a number of potential problems with using tax statistics data; it is collected as part of an 
administrative routine in which individuals have incentives to underreport income, it tells us nothing per se about 
the welfare of individuals, etc. Nevertheless, as long as we think that tax statistics, at least for the top income 
earners, approximate actual incomes, and as long as the problems with the statistics have not changed systemati-
cally over time, they are a useful source. Importantly, it is also the only available source for much of the twenti-
eth century. Our general view in the case of Sweden is that the administrative process has, compared to most 
countries, been very thorough and Swedish tax data is quite reliable, at least for high income groups. The esti-
mates of tax avoidance and evasion that we have found suggest that the levels have not changed in any system-
atic way over the century. A speculative explanation for this observation would be that as marginal taxes have 
increased (and hence the incentives to avoid or evade taxes) the administrative systems and control efforts have 
also been expanded. A quantitatively more important way of “avoiding taxation” in Sweden has probably been to 
keep wealth and “potential income” in tax exempt institutions and/or firms.   6
sonal wealth in different income classes for some years.
10 To make these data homogenous 
and comparable over time, a number of adjustments have been made as described in more 
detail in Table 1. Our preferred concept of income is total (gross) income, defined as income 
from all sources before taxes and transfers, but deducting deficits at source (mainly interest 
payments). Capital gains are included in this concept, but the structure of the data allows us to 
subtract them and construct series both with and without capital gains.
11 One specific attribute 
of the Swedish income statistics is that after 1974, new laws made several transfer-like non-
market incomes such as unemployment compensation, family allowances and sick pay, fully 
taxable, and hence the tax-based total income concept less like the concept of market income 
compared to previous years. However, under the assumption that very small fractions of top 
incomes are constituted by these non-market sources, we have also constructed series using an 
income concept closer to market income by subtracting the aggregate amount of the non-
market sources from the reference income total after 1973.
12 Concerning coverage, yearly 
data are available only from 1943 and for the earlier years we use a number of special investi-
gations made by the statistics authorities or the Ministry of Finance.
13 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
To calculate the reference totals for income there are basically two ways in which to proceed: 
either one starts from total income reported on tax returns and then add items not included in 
the tax base as well as income estimates of individuals not filing taxes (not including chil-
dren), or one may start from the National Accounts item “Total Personal Sector Income” from 
which all that is not included in the preferred definition of income can be deducted. Thanks to 
the relative richness of Swedish historical tax data and national accounts, we have been able 
to calculate our reference total for income in a number of ways and our final preferred series 
                                                 
10 Between 1910 and 1948 Sweden had a peculiar kind of wealth tax, which operated through an addition of a 
fraction (1/60 until 1938, thereafter 1/100) of taxable wealth to total income to get “taxable income”. This cre-
ates problems in terms of having to adjust tax data to get actual incomes (without the wealth shares) but it also 
means that information on wealth distribution by income class is available.   
11 Data on capital gains are available in 1945, 1951, and annually from 1967. In 1945 and 1951, the capital gains 
shares were very low for all fractiles. We use the 1945 shares as estimates for all prior years (see Roine and 
Waldenström, 2006, for more details). 
12 For some years we have direct observations on the size of transfers by income class and this data supports the 
assumption that these transfers constitute very small shares of total income in the top of the distribution..  
13 Tax return-based data tabulated in classes of income are available for the years 1903 (only the very top), 1907, 
1911, 1912, 1916, 1919, 1920, 1934 and 1941. Since tax returns formed the basis for the income distribution 
estimates in the Censuses (Folkräkningen), we also have data from 1920, 1930, 1935, 1945 and 1950.   7
combine both ways of constructing the reference total for income.
14 When creating a series for 
the reference tax population, we incorporate the fact that the Swedish tax law (and published 
income statistics) changed from being family-based, in which married couples were assessed 
jointly, to being individual-based. Our reference population total, hence, shifts from being the 
adult population (16 and above) minus married women, to the entire adult population (16 and 
above).
15 To get a sense of the size of the fractiles and what it takes in terms of income to be 
part of a particular income share today, Table 2 presents some descriptive statistics for 2003. 
As the incomes are highly dependent on whether capital gains are included or not we have 
included both in the table. 
 
Table 2 about here 
3  The Basic Facts 
3.1  Top income shares 1903-2004 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the top decile income share in Sweden over the period 1903–
2004. The broad trend is that this share has been divided by a factor of two over the first 
eighty years, from around 46 percent of total income in the first years of the century, to 23 
percent in 1980. Approximately two thirds of this decline took place before 1950, with large 
falls in the volatile years just after World War I (1919–1920), and in the years after World 
War II (1945–1951). This means that most of the drop in pre-tax income inequality took place 
before the expansion of the welfare state. The decline thereafter is more stable with a new 
relatively sharp drop in the late 1960s and over the 1970s to a lowest point around 23 percent 
in the early 1980s.
16 After the mid-1980s the trend depends crucially on the treatment of capi-
tal gains incomes. When these are included, the income share for the top ten percent increases 
                                                 
14 Our main sources for calculating the reference income total are the new National Accounts data for Sweden 
compiled by Edvinsson (2005) and Swedish tax statistics (Skattetaxeringen till inkomst och förmögenhet, various 
years). For details see Roine and Waldenström (2006), where we also show that our findings are robust to alter-
native specifications of this reference total. 
15 The main source for our reference population series are Statistics Sweden, Population Statistics (SCB, Pro-
grammet för befolkningsstatistik). The shift from family- to individual-based taxation happened gradually be-
tween 1952 and 1970. We constructed a number of alternative reference totals to capture the possible variations 
across the different legal regimes, but found no significant effects on our basic findings. Moreover, we also 
changed the age cutoff of the adult population from 16 years to 20 years, which lowered top income shares by 
roughly five percent for the post-1951 period for which there are detailed age data. 
16 The period between 1951 and 1971 is potentially problematic as Swedish data gradually move from a family- 
to an individually-based tax system (even though the legal change happens in 1967, when individual tax filing 
was made optional, and 1971 when it became compulsory). We have tried a number of different specifications 
for dealing with this gradual change, and while the levels may change over this period by as much a ten percent, 
the trend and our qualitatively results are not altered; see Roine and Waldenström (2006) for details.    8
substantially, but when capital gains are excluded the top share remains quite stable, though it 
does increase slightly (we will analyze this in more detail in section 3.2). The peaks in 1991 
and 1994 in the series including capital gains are well known effects due to tax reforms which 
made it profitable to sell assets in these years. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
Even though this development in itself reveals a number of interesting facts, it turns out that 
decomposing the top decile is crucial for understanding the development. Figure 2 shows the 
evolution of the income shares for P90–95, P95–99, and P99–100 respectively. Looking first 
at the decline over the first eighty years of the century, we see that virtually all of the drop in 
the top decile income share is due to a decrease in the very top of the distribution. The income 
share for the lower half of the top decile (P90–95) has been remarkably stable, hovering 
around 10 percent over the entire period, while the P95–99 share declines gradually from 
about 15 percent of total income in the beginning of the twentieth century to around 10 per-
cent in the early 1980s, with the sharpest drop over the 1970s. In contrast, the top percentile 
income share is divided by at least a factor of four, dropping from above 20 percent in the 
early 1900s, to around 7 percent in early 1950s, to a low of 4.7 percent in the beginning of the 
1980s. Over the past decades the pattern is similar; P90-95 is stable (whether including capital 
gains or not), P95-99 increases slightly as does P99-100 when excluding capital gains, but the 
major difference appears only when including capital gains for the top percentile. Over sev-
eral years in the late 1990s the income share of the top percentile is about twice as large when 
including capital gains compared to excluding them. 
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
The above becomes even starker when we consider higher fractiles within the top percent. 
Figure 3 shows the income share top 0.01 percent of the income distribution. This share was 
divided by a factor of about eight over the first half of the century, from above 3 percent of 
income to around 0.4 percent in the early 1950s. Given that most of the income in the very top 
consists of capital income it is interesting to note that the major falls take place during the 
financial crises after World War I, in the early 1930s, and after World War II, but notably, not 
during World War II. This period (1939–1945), which in many other countries was one of 
major cuts in top income shares, seems to have been a period of relative stability for the very   9
top groups in Sweden. From the 1950s the P99.99 income share continues to decline steadily 
to their lowest points in the late 1970s after which it recovers, reaching new peaks at the time 
the stock market boom around 2000 given that we include capital gains. If we compare the 
incomes share for this top group when including and excluding capital gains respectively, the 
difference is a factor ten in order of magnitude, which again highlights the impact of capital 
gains in Swedish top incomes. Expressing the incomes of the top 0.01 percent group in multi-
ples of average income, our data suggests that over the twentieth century their income has 
gone from being around 300 times the average income in the early 1900s, falling down to 
around 25 times average income in the 70s, and then rising to more than 100 times average 
income in the late 1990s (again when including capital gains). 
 
Figure 3 about here 
3.2  Composition of top incomes 
Examining the composition of top incomes is important for the understanding of the devel-
opment of top income shares. For example, shocks to capital income during World Wars I and 
II explain much of the decline in French top incomes (Piketty, 2003) while large increases in 
wage and salaries has been the prime factor behind the increased income inequality in the 
U.S. during the 1980s and 1990s (Piketty and Saez, 2004). The composition of Swedish top 
incomes also changes significantly during the twentieth century, and these changes hold im-
portant clues for explaining the general patterns. 
 
The sources of income which are distinguished in Swedish tax laws are income from labor 
(wages and salaries), capital (mainly interest earnings and dividends), business and capital 
gains.
17 Table 3 displays the decomposition of the declines in Swedish top income shares (ex-
cluding capital gains) of some fractiles between 1912 and 1980. In the period, 1912–1935, 
basically the entire decrease in total income shares is due to falls in capital income. This ex-
plains about two thirds of the drop for the top percentile and above. During the period 1935–
1951, the falls in total income shares are about the same size as in 1912–1935 (–9.4% com-
pared to –12.9% for P95–99, –39.3% compared to –41.1% for P99–100), but now with about 
                                                 
17 As discussed in Appendix A in Roine and Waldenström (2006) the Swedish income statistics reported six 
different sources of incomes until 1990 and only three thereafter. Using available data we are however able to 
construct consistent and continuous series of the four above-mentioned sources for the entire post-war period. 
For the earlier periods we rely on data from the censuses (1920, 1930, 1935 and 1945) and estimates of returns to 
wealth to calculate approximate shares.   10
half of the decrease attributed to a decreased wage share for top income earners. In the post-
war period 1950–1980, the total income shares continue to fall, but now it is not mainly capi-
tal shares, nor wage shares, but mainly business income that falls. Over this period business 
income goes from constituting approximately 20 percent of total incomes in the top decile to 
being only a couple of percent in 1980.
18 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
As could be seen in the main series above, the treatment of capital gains is crucial for judging 
the development of Swedish top income shares after 1980. Capital gains are often excluded 
from studies of income inequality due to their potentially problematic character (even though 
they constitute an undisputable part of income according to the classical Haig-Simons defini-
tion). Unlike other incomes capital gains are not typically thought of as a flow of income, but 
rather single realizations of gains potentially earned over a longer period of time. This is most 
likely true if the capital gains arise from the sale of a house, for example, but it need not be 
the case if the capital gains instead come from frequent stock market trading. In studies based 
on tax returns capital gains are sometimes excluded simply because they are not included in 
the country’s income statistics (as in France where they were not subject to taxation before the 
1980s) but in most studies series including as well as excluding capital gains have been con-
structed. As has already been mentioned above, the difference between the series including 
and excluding capital gains constitute one of the quantitatively most interesting features of 
recent developments in Swedish top income shares. Even though there is no doubt that some 
fluctuations (especially the peaks in top income shares in 1993 and 1995 when sales due to 
tax reasons were relatively attractive) are due to the timing of sales of accumulated wealth, 
the majority of capital gains earners in the top of the distribution are not likely to be “new” 
individuals each year, who sell off assets accumulated over a longer period, but are instead 
those with the highest earnings who year after year make most of their income from capital 
gains (see Section 4.3 below). 
 
To further illustrate the large differences both within the top decile as well as over time Figure 
4 shows the income composition for different fractiles in the years 1945, 1978 and 2004. The 
general pattern that capital income is more important higher up in the distribution is true for 
                                                 
18 The drop in self-employment income should not be taken as evidence of decreased small-business activity, per 
se, as self-employed individuals may choose to start a firm from which they pay themselves regular wages, etc.   11
all of these years. However, between 1945 and 1978 the wage share at all levels of top in-
comes became more important, while the share of business income decreased at all levels. But 
in 2004 the pattern is back to that of 1945 in terms of the importance of capital if we include 
capital gains. In fact, at the very top of the income distribution, the share of capital gains in 
income today is larger than the return to capital was in 1945. 
 
Figure 4 about here  
3.3  Total income shares vs. market income shares – excluding taxable transfers 
In 1974 a number of work-related transfer programs, such as unemployment insurance, sick-
ness payments, and parental leave payments, became taxable. As such programs have grown 
in importance over time it could be argued that our series of total gross (pre-tax) income sha-
res have gone from being shares of market income (or even factor income) in the earlier parts 
of the century to being shares of a pre-tax income concept which includes substantial de-facto 
transfers. To address the impact of these transfers on our income shares we have calculated 
series in which we exclude the most important transfer payments.
19 In our basic series above 
we added the total government outlays for the transfers that were made taxable in 1974 to the 
reference total for income for the period before 1974. Under the assumption that these trans-
fers made up a negligible share of top incomes before 1974, this adjustment suffices to make 
the series conform to the current definition of gross pre-tax income. To exclude the transfers 
we basically do the opposite. Before 1974 we do not make any additions to the reference total 
for income, while after 1974 we deduct total transfers from the reference total. However, we 
must now also take care of the fact that transfer incomes, while being small shares of top in-
comes, are not zero for everyone in the top decile. To correct our shares we rely on exact data 
on the size of these transfers by income class for the years 1974–1977 and from 1991 and 
onwards, and estimations for the period in between.  
 
Figure 5 displays the changes in the series for P90–99 and P99–100 (panel a and b respec-
tively) when including these transfers in the income concept (Total income, which are our 
main series) and when excluding them (Market income). The basic trend is that market in-
come shares go from being relatively equal to total income shares in the 1950s, starts to grow 
in the 1970s and are about 20 percent higher in the beginning of the twenty first century. The 
                                                 
19 The most important transfers are unemployment insurance, sickness payments, and parental leave payments. 
Transfers which are not taxed (such as child benefits, housing benefits, study grants, etc.) never enter our series. 
See Roine and Waldenström (2006) for details.   12
marked recent increase is likely to be an effect of large increases in sickness payments. Again, 
the difference within the top decile becomes apparent. The difference in income share of the 
P90–99 group when including and when excluding transfers is quite important, much more so 
than including or excluding capital gains. For the P99–100 income shares the opposite is true. 
The difference between total income and market income shares are much smaller than that 
between shares including or excluding capital gains. 
 
Figure 5 about here 
4  Explaining the evolution of top income shares in Sweden 
What accounts for the large declines of top income shares in the first half of the twentieth 
century, the steady decline during the expansion of the welfare state, the relatively sharp 
drops over the 1970s, and the conditional increase (only apparent when capital gains are in-
cluded) in the recent decades? Two aspects, repeatedly stressed above, stand out as key ex-
planatory components. First, the secular decline in income inequality is largely driven by de-
creases in the top one percent of the income distribution, and second, these changes are in turn 
to a large extent driven by changes in income from capital. Similarly, the increase in top in-
come shares over the past decades is also almost entirely a top percentile phenomenon and 
largely due to capital gains income. 
 
In this section we will discuss different factors that can contribute to our understanding of the 
evolution of the top income shares presented above. First, we examine the roles of factor 
shares and wealth distribution, and their respective changes over time. In particular, the Swed-
ish tax system before 1948 provides us with data on wealth by income class. Second, we map 
the evolution of the Swedish progressive income tax system, and third, we account for the 
recent dramatic changes in asset prices, arguing that these are fundamental for understanding 
the particular Swedish experience with very large differences in top shares depending on 
whether capital gains are included or not. Finally, we relate our findings to previous discus-
sions on the Swedish “Kuznets curve”.
20 
                                                 
20 According to Morrison (2000), Sweden is as an example of a country which exhibits an inequality pattern in 
line with the Kuznets hypothesis between 1870 and 1950.    13
4.1  The roles of factor shares and the wealth distribution 
According to David Ricardo, “the principal problem of Political Economy [...] is to determine 
how [...] the produce of the earth … is divided between … the proprietor of the land, the 
owner of the stock of capital needed for its cultivation, and the labourers by whose industry it 
is cultivated”.
21 If we were to assume that the very top of the income distribution consists of 
mainly of wealth holders, while the rest of the population consists mainly of wage earning 
workers, fluctuations in factor shares should also explain fluctuations in income shares. (We 
shall return to the question of how good an approximation this is below). Figure 6 shows the 
changes in the capital share of value added (defined as GDP by activity, minus wages and 
salaries, minus imputed labor income of self-employed) as a share of GDP, and the evolution 
of the top one percent income share. 
 
Figure 6 about here 
 
The correlation between the two series over the whole period is 0.86, but with a clear differ-
ence between the first and second half of the century. Between 1907 and 1950 the correlation 
is 0.94, while it drops to 0.55 between 1951 and 2000. This indicates that, at least during the 
first fifty years, even short term fluctuations of top incomes follow the fluctuations of the 
capital share of value added as a share of GDP. The figure also shows a downward trend in 
the capital share of value added over the first 80 years and a conservative reading would sug-
gest a drop in this share from around 0.35 in the first decade, to approximately 0.25 in the 
1970s and 1980s.
22 If we were to take this share as a proxy for the share of GDP derived as a 
return to property it would translate directly to an equally large drop in the income share of 
property holders who, in turn, are found mainly among the top income earners. These rela-
tionships are, of course, not as simple as suggested by quoting Ricardo above, firstly because 
no income class consists of only wage earners or only property holders, and secondly because 
a number of institutions (such as firms and the government sector) stand between the produc-
tive sector and the personal sector who’s income distribution we are concerned with. But, 
                                                 
21 Originally quoted in Atkinson (1975, p 161). 
22 The question of factor shares, to what extent they are relatively stable over time, and how “relatively stable” 
should be interpreted, is of course a much debated question. See Atkinson (1975, chapter 9), for a good overview 
and a historical perspective, where it is also noted that the labor share seems to have been increasing at least 
since the 1930s up to the 1970s in a number of Western economies.   14
nevertheless, such approximations give a sense of the magnitude by which the respective fac-
tors could have changed the income shares.
23 
 
In the case of Sweden, however, there exist unusual data on individual wealth holdings by 
precisely those groups for which we also have income data. The reason is that between the 
years 1910 and 1948 Sweden had a peculiar form of joint income- and wealth taxation in 
which taxes were levied on what was called the taxable amount, consisting of all income plus 
a share of net wealth holdings. For selected years, tabulations of incomes decomposed into 
actual income and wealth shares by income class are available.
24 Similar information is also 
available in the 1950 Census (for the year 1951) and for the years 1991–1993. This allows us 
to calculate the wealth shares held by top income groups. Figure 7 shows the evolution of 
wealth shares by income class, together with our calculations of wealth shares (by wealth 
class) and income shares (by income class) for P99–100 and P90–99 of the respective distri-
butions.
25 Not surprisingly, wealth shares by income class follow the fluctuations of income 
shares closer than do wealth shares, but the trends seem to be the same. The wealth share of 
the top percent among the income earners, as well as among wealth holders, is decreasing 
quite dramatically over the century with slight recoveries over the past decades.
26 The wealth 
shares for the P90–99 group, both in the income and in the wealth distribution, are instead 
increasing until around 1950. After that they fall slightly, to recover again after the mid 
1980s. Once again this highlights the importance of distinguishing between different groups 
in the top to understand the trends. In terms of explaining the evolution of income shares these 
wealth trends are well in line with our findings that almost all of the fall in the top decile in-
                                                 
23 Among the interesting details found by studying the development of the capital share of value added as share 
of GDP is that it is likely to explain the peak in the top income share in 1916. The first years of World War I was 
a period during which industrial companies made huge profits while the majority of the population experienced 
substantial falls in real wages and trade restrictions that lead to a food shortage (see Edvinsson (2005), p 242, 
and references given there). The year 1916, which is the only year for which we have data during this period, 
was most probably the most extreme year. The average wage rate fell by ten percent and the ratio between gross 
surplus and labor income jumped from about 50 percent in 1914–15, to around 70 percent in 1916–17 (after 
which it fell back down to 50 percent in 1918–19), indicating that 1916 was a year when the income share of 
capital owners was very high compared to the years immediately before and after.    
24 The taxable amount was equal to all income plus 1/60th of taxable wealth between 1910 and 1938 and there 
after all income plus 1/100th of taxable wealth until 1948. 
25 Our series for wealth distribution are based tax return data and are for the years 1920-1975 similar to Spånt 
(1975) and for the years 1978-2002 to series calculated by Statistics Sweden (2002), rather that more recent 
estimates based on household panel data (such as Klevmarken, 2004). In the present context these figures are 
most relevant as we are trying to estimate the impact of wealth concentration on income concentration rather 
than some measure of living standards.   
26 The top percent wealth share in the wealth distribution has increased over the past decades and assuming that 
the the wealth of the top income earners has followed this is true for them as well. However, we only have data 
on the years between 1991 and 1993.     15
come share stems from the top percentile and that this fall, especially in the first half of the 
century, is due to decreases in capital income. 
 
Figure 7 about here 
 
What would be the joint impact of the changes in wealth concentration and the changes in 
factor shares on the income distribution? Following Meade (1964), we can make a simple 
approximation to get a sense of the magnitude of the effect. Let a and b be the share of all 
earnings and all returns to property, respectively, received by a certain income group. Then 
the total income share of this group is given by 
 
a · (factor share of earnings)  +  b · (factor share of property). 
 
Taking 0.5 times the wealth share of the top income group as a proxy for b, and setting the 
factor share of property to 0.3 (alternatively letting the factor share fluctuate and take on the 
yearly value calculated above) we can get a sense of the magnitude of the impact that changes 
in wealth concentration at the top of the income distribution has had between 1911 and 
1991.
27 Table 4 gives an example of such a calculation for P99–100. 
 
Table 4 about here 
 
Table 4 suggests that the direction of change is correct for all intervals except for the period 
1920–1930 when the income share increases slightly for the top percent of income earners but 
their wealth share drops. Between 1911 and 1920, however, the magnitudes are not right. The 
income share increases slightly more 1911–1916 and, in particular, drops much more 1916–
1920 than what can be explained by changes in wealth shares. The results for the period 
1930–1935 plausibly suggests that most of the fall in the top income shares 1930–34, as well 
as the recovery 1934–1935 were due to changes in financial wealth. For the period thereafter, 
1935–1951 wealth changes played a smaller role in the decreasing top income shares (com-
                                                 
27 Approximating b by 0.5 times the wealth share is based on assuming that the ratio of financial assets to total 
assets is about 0.5 (this ratio was 0.49 for households in Sweden in 1995). This figure clearly fluctuates over 
time and across income groups but as our calculations are only intended to give a sense of magnitude and direc-
tion it does not affect the conclusions we draw. The numbers in Table 4 resulting from changes in wealth can be 
multiplied by 2 to get the impact of assuming b=wealth share, or divided by 2 if b=0.25 times wealth share.   16
pare to Table 3 above) while the changes in wealth in the period 1951–1991 suggests that top 
income shares should have fallen more than they did.  
 
Overall, the above suggests that an important reason for the substantial drop in the top one 
percent income share - which is driving the decreased income share of the top ten percent -  
especially before 1950, is the decreased wealth share of the top income earners, which in turn 
decreased their share of returns to property. However, the question of why the top wealth 
share decreased so substantially has no obvious answer. Sweden did not take part in World 
War I or World War II and even though the country’s economy was of course not unaffected 
by these events, the wars did not cause the same direct destruction of capital in Sweden as 
they did in many other countries. If single events are to be pointed out, the crises just after 
World War I and the effects of the Great Depression, which hit Sweden in 1931, and in par-
ticular the dramatic collapse of the industrial empire controlled by the Swedish industrialist 
Ivar Kreuger (the “Kreuger-crash”) in 1932 are probably most important.
28 Between 1908 
and 1920 we see considerable drops in top wealth shares but not a corresponding drop in 
wealth holdings of the top percent income earners between 1911 and 1920 (though there is a 
considerable drop from the peak in 1916).
29 Between 1930 and 1935 we observe a drop from 
50 percent to 43 percent in the top percent wealth share but an even larger drop in the wealth 
of the top one percent of income earners, from 38 percent in 1930 to 26 percent in 1934 (see 
Figure 7 above). World War II, however, does not seem to have been a major shock to wealth 
holdings in Sweden. The top one percent share does drop from 43 to 37 percent between 1935 
and 1945, but the drop just after the war is just as sharp continuing down to 32 percent in 
1950 (see Section 5 for more on this point in international perspective). The movements for 
top wealth shares by income class are similar. Overall, during the first half of the twentieth 
century the top percentile wealth shares, both in the wealth distribution and in the income 
distribution, were divided by a factor two. By 1950 progressive taxation has started to play a 
major part and the most likely explanation of the continued decreasing top wealth share is that 
a larger share of new wealth is accumulated in the corporate and government sector and 
among the rest of the population, rather than in the wealthiest percent.  
                                                 
28 In Sweden, the economic crisis in the early 1920s was in many ways more severe than the one ten years later 
which coincided with the “Great Depression” in America. 
29 There could be problem in the data as the sources for 1911 and 1912 for wealth by income class are tax return 
data for the first two years when the wealth tax was implemented, which could underestimate the wealth in the 
top shares, while the 1908 wealth data is based on estates. By 1920 the system of joint income and wealth taxa-
tion was well established and wealth data was also collected for the Census which leads us to think that these 
series are relatively reliable at least from that point on.     17
4.2  The role of taxation 
Many previous studies have shown that top incomes are sensitive to changes in top marginal 
income tax rates, either through their direct effect on work incentives or through more subtle 
processes of tax arbitrage (see Saez (2004) for an overview of this literature). For example, 
Saez and Veall (2005) showed that Canadian top income shares were negatively correlated 
with Canadian marginal income tax rates, with elasticities of income with respect to the net-
of-tax rates for the top 1 percent being about unity.  
 
In the case of Sweden, Figure 8 depicts the statutory marginal tax rates for incomes at the 
90th, 99th, 99.9th and 99.99th percentiles over the past century.
30 These rates started to in-
crease from moderate levels in the second half of the 1930s and more than doubled at all 
thresholds between 1935 and 1950, reaching 65 percent at P99.99 and close to 30 percent for 
P90. After 1950 the rise continued, reaching a peak in 1980 at 85 percent for the very top in-
come earners and just above 60 percent for the top decile. After this, marginal taxes were 
lowered somewhat in the mid-1980s and much more so after the tax reform of 1990–1991. In 
the post-1990 period, we plot the highest marginal tax rate in the figure although this only 
applied to earned income (wages and business income) while capital income was taxed sepa-
rately at a lower, flat rate. The marginal tax on total income after 1990 is hence somewhat 
lower than the figure shows.  
 
Figure 8 about here 
 
Figure 8 proposes a clear linkage between the developments of Swedish marginal income 
taxation and top income inequality, at least after World War II.
31 The fact that there are sharp 
falls in the very top of the income distribution in the late 1940s, while the sharpest drops in 
the P90-99 group takes place in the 1970s, fits well with when marginal tax rates are in-
creased the most for the respective groups. However, given that much of the fall in top in-
comes happens before taxes reach extreme levels and largely as a result of decreasing income 
from wealth, the major effect of taxation in terms of top income shares has been to prevent the 
                                                 
30 The presented marginal tax rates are the sum of the respective rates at the local (kommunalskatt) and state 
(statlig skatt) levels, calculated using tables in Söderberg (1996). 
31 A similar linkage was found for Canada by Saez and Veall (2005).   18
accumulation of new fortunes. To the extent that new fortunes were created they most proba-
bly remained in the corporate sector.
32 
 
To get a better picture of the role of taxation for Swedish top income shares, we estimate tax 
elasticities in several top income levels for the postwar period (1943–1990).
33 In particular, 
we relate the incomes at the 90th, 99th, 99.9th and 99.99th income percentiles (listed in Ap-
pendix Table A2) to the statutory marginal tax rate (with both local and state taxes) using data 
in Söderberg (1996). Then log-linear time series regressions are estimated for each percentile 
separately, as follows: 
  ()
2
01 2 3 ln( ) ln(1 ) Pt Pt t SM T R t t u ββ β β =+ − + + + , (1) 
 
where SP denotes income share for percentile P = P90, P99, P99.9, P99.99, (1 – MTRP) the 
corresponding net-of-tax rate (one minus the marginal tax rate), t a linear time trend and ut a 
random error.
34 We estimate OLS regressions using Newey-West standard errors to correct 
for serial correlation in the residuals, but since inflation my push up incomes into higher tax 
brackets (“bracket-creep”) and give rise to a too low estimated tax elasticity ( 1 ˆ β ), we also fit 
two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions in which log of one minus the highest statutory 
marginal tax rate is used to instrument for this eventuality.
35 The results in Table 5 show that 
the tax elasticity increases in income and that influence bracket-creep is of minor importance 
(i.e., OLS and 2SLS results are very similar). In the P90 case, the OLS tax elasticity is zero 
and 0.3 in the 2SLS, but as the Hausman test indicates that the OLS estimate might be biased 
downward, the higher 2SLS estimate are the more robust one. Altogether, these results are in 
line with the prior expectations, as well as with findings from estimated tax responses of U.S. 
top income earners studied by Saez (2004). Progressive taxation hence seems to have been a 
major contributing factor in explaining the evolution of Swedish top incomes in the postwar 
period.  
Table 5 about here 
                                                 
32 The particular structure of ownership via various tax exempt institutions due to tax reasons have been well 
documented in, e.g., Henrekson and Jakobsson (2005). 
33 Before 1943, there is no annual data and after the tax reform of 1990–1991, wages and capital income were 
taxed at separate tax rates. 
34 Equation (1) is inspired by Saez (2004), but unlike him we use threshold incomes and corresponding marginal 
tax rates instead of average incomes in a group of income earners, say P99–100, and the corresponding weighted 
average marginal income tax for all the various income levels contained in the top percentile group. 
35 Bracket-creep is when inflation pushes incomes up in higher tax brackets and increases the marginal tax rate 
automatically.    19
4.3  The role of asset prices 
One aspect which stands out in our series over the past decades is the large difference in top 
income shares between including and excluding capital gains income. Whether capital gains 
should be included in the income concept is debatable and ultimately depends on the ques-
tions at hand.
36 When it comes to studying Swedish income inequality, and in particular in the 
absolute top over recent decades, we argue that capital gains incomes are too important to be 
ignored. Our main motive for this is the development of Swedish stock prices, which in com-
parison with any other Western economy stand out as remarkable.
37 Figure 9 shows the evolu-
tion of the composite stock price index, in real terms, at the Stockholm Stock Exchange and 
three top income fractiles belonging to different part of the top decile since 1967 (which is the 
first year with separate capital gains figures for different total income classes). The figure 
clearly suggests that the capital gains accruing to the top income earners to a large extent 
emanate from value increases of financial holdings, and for each fractile the correlation with 
the stock price index is over 0.90 and highly significant.
38 
 
Figure 9 about here 
 
One of the major concerns with including capital gains in the analyzed total income concept is 
the possibility that some tax payers in the top income fractiles are there only because of recent 
realizations of gains that have been accumulated over a longer period of time. However, using 
tabulated income data listing capital gains earnings in classes of labor income (which ex-
cludes capital gains), we can, at least after 1990, confirm that this is not the case for the most 
part of our analyzed capital gains incomes.
39 
 
Altogether, our data suggest that the substantial increases in capital gains that drive much of 
the observed rise in top income shares in Sweden over the past decades is entirely due to in-
                                                 
36 See for example Atkinson (1975), Chapter 3, for a general discussion and, in particular Björklund, Palme and 
Svensson (1995) for a discussion of the effects from including income from real capital in the Swedish case. 
37 Over the period 1980–2000, the real stock price index at the Stockholm Stock Exchange increased 20 times 
while the same indexes in New York, London and Paris increased four to six times over the same period. 
38 Compared to real estate prices, which have also increased substantially over the past decades (starting at 100 
in 1981, the housing price index was 360 while the consumer price index was 250, in 2003) the gains from equi-
ties are much larger and also much more concentrated. However, it is likely that the increase in wealth holdings 
for the top ten percent (even when excluding the top percent) is largely due to the increases in owner occupied 
housing prices. 
39 Looking at the average realized capital gains over labor income classes, the overwhelmingly largest average 
capital gains in the entire period 1991–2004 accrue to those who already are positioned in the top of the income 
distribution. See Roine and Waldenström (2006, appendix ) for details.   20
creases financial asset prices on the Swedish stock market. The question of how top income 
shares have developed over the past decades can not be answered in a satisfactory manner 
without making the answer conditional on the inclusion of capital gains.  
4.4  Our series and the Kuznets hypothesis 
The development of Swedish income inequality has previously been suggested to display sup-
port of the Kuznets hypothesis, i.e., that income inequality is inversely U-shaped over the path 
of development.
40 For example, in his study of salaries across sectors, Söderberg (1991) found 
that inequality increased from 1870 to 1914, dropped sharply during World War I, increased 
again between 1920 and 1930 before it turned down for the rest of the studied period until 
1950. As industrialization in Sweden started around 1870 and peaked around the turn of the 
century, the increase in income inequality between 1870 and 1914 and the declining thereaf-
ter, has been interpreted as an example of Kuznets’ curve,  
 
We have so far in this analysis mainly tried to find explanations to the observed secular de-
cline in Swedish top income inequality over the century, and found that drops in top capital 
income and the rise of progressive taxation have played a large role. Do these findings con-
tradict Kuznets’ hypothesis, which rather focuses on changing differentials in wages across 
workers with differing skill composition? Not necessarily. We can use the historical fact (re-
call section 3.2) that wages constituted almost all of the incomes going to the high-income 
groups just below the absolute top, e.g., the P90–95 group, who, if any, in our data represent 
the highly skilled workers in Kuznets model. Although Figure 2 above showed that their share 
of all incomes remained remarkably stable of the century, when relating their incomes to the 
rest of the (mainly) wage earning population, i.e., P0–90, Figure 10 depicts a relationship that 
could be interpreted as support for a Kuznets curve. Specifically, it shows the ratio between 
the income shares of P90–95 and P0–90 and the downward sloping pattern seems to be in line 
with what has previously been found by Söderberg (1991).
41 
 
Figure 10 about here 
 
                                                 
40 See the section on Sweden in Morrison (2000). 
41 The data in the figure is excluding capital gains (we will study series when including capital gains for the other 
countries below). The pattern is similar when we instead look at the ratio between average income in P90−95 
and that of P0−90 as well as when calculate this ratio using earned income only.    21
Our data, hence, suggest two things with respect to the Kuznets hypothesis. First, if we ex-
clude the capital owners at the top of the distribution, and focus on the ratio between two 
groups whose income mainly consists of wages, those with the highest wages and the rest, we 
get a pattern consistent with what has previously been found as support for the Kuznets curve. 
Second, however, these changes are not the main explanation behind the secular decline of 
inequality in Sweden. Even though we do see movement in what approximately constitute the 
ratio of income shares of high skilled and low skilled workers, the changes in capital income 
at the very top of the distribution account for the majority of income equalization. 
5  International comparisons 
In Figure 11 the long-run development of top percentile income shares in a number of West-
ern countries is shown alongside that of Sweden.
42  
 
Figure 11 about here 
 
Looking at the figure, three broad facts stand out. First, all countries experience a similar de-
velopment with large decreases in top income shares between the beginning of the 1900s and 
the mid-1970s. The drop in Swedish top incomes over this period is the largest among all 
these countries, both in absolute and relative terms, but interestingly, much of the difference 
between Sweden and the other countries in Figure 11 is established already by 1950. Second, 
the effect of World War II, which for all countries directly engaged in warfare turned out to 
be devastating for top incomes (see, e.g., Atkinson and Leigh, 2005; Piketty and Saez, 2006), 
is practically non-existent in Sweden. Table 6 shows this fact in more detail. During the war, 
the top income share for P99–100 decreased by between 13 and 40 percent in countries di-
rectly involved in warfare, but by less than five percent in Sweden. In the years just after the 
war, by contrast, Swedish top shares dropped over 27 percent whereas they in other countries 
decreased less than half of that and, in some cases, even increased by up to 20 percent. 
 
Table 6 about here 
 
The third fact that stands out in Figure 11 is the divergence after 1980 between one group of 
countries with significantly increasing top shares; Australia, Canada, U.K. and the U.S., and 
                                                 
42 The figure would look very similar for P90–100 and for P99.9–100.   22
another group;  France, the Netherlands and Spain, where the top shares remain virtually con-
stant.
43 This division between the “Anglo-Saxon” and “Continental European” experience has 
received a lot of attention in the previous literature.
44 As can be seen in the figure, Sweden 
does not belong entirely to either one of these groups. More precisely, if capital gains are in-
cluded Swedish top incomes shares have increased so much that the Swedish development 
resembles that of the Anglo-Saxon group. However, when capital gains are excluded, Sweden 
looks more like belonging to the Continental European group. This difference in the series is 
unique to Sweden among the countries for which this distinction has been possible to make. 
Whether capital gains are included or not makes very little difference to the pattern of devel-
opment in The U.S., Canada, as well as Spain.
45  
 
This distinction between series including and excluding capital gains holds an important key 
to understanding the Swedish development in international comparison. Previous work on top 
incomes has pointed out that the main change over the twentieth century in Anglo-Saxon 
countries, and in particular in the U.S. has been the replacement of the rentiers by the working 
rich in the top of the income distribution (see e.g. Piketty and Saez, 2006). To what extent this 
in turn depends on increased returns to education and skill-biased technological change is a 
much debated issue, however, the fact that so much of the increase in the top happens in the 
very top (top one percent) has made many skeptical of a return-to-education story.
46 Our data 
for Sweden also seems to indicate that a skill-biased technological change story is not the 
most likely explanation for the observed changes. First, as was discussed above the move-
ments for the lower part of the top decile P90–95 account for very little of the top decile in-
come share. This is true both when including and excluding capital gains and, hence, suggests 
that to the extent that we think that high-skilled workers make up most of this group, their 
income share has not increased substantially over the past decades. Second, and more impor-
tant, is the large difference in the development in the top depending on how capital gains are 
treated. The economic interpretation of this development rests on a distinction which we can 
not entirely make based on our data. If we believe that much of the observed capital gains, in 
fact, stem from compensation for work made by e.g. chief-executives and other high income 
                                                 
43 This division has previously been discussed in Saez (2004) and Atkinson and Leigh (2005), who also show 
that this division remains true when including New Zealand to the “Anglo-Saxon” group.  
44 See e.g. Piketty and Saez (2006). 
45 In the case of France this distinction is not very important, according to Piketty (2001, p. 20n), as the capital 
gains share is very small even for the top income earners. The same relationship seems true for Germany (Dell, 
2005, p. 414, fn.2). 
46 Piketty and Saez (2003) are, for example sceptical of the skill-biased technological change explanation for the 
U.S. See also Dew-Becker and Gordon (2005).   23
individuals, then the Swedish development should be seen as resembling the Anglo-Saxon 
one, with working rich receiving an increasing share of all incomes over the past decades. 
What makes this interpretation plausible is the observed correlation between capital gains and 
wage incomes discussed in Section 4, as well as the fact that Sweden has a dual tax system 
where capital incomes are taxed at lower rates than wage incomes. If, however, these capital 
gains do not stem directly from work but just from making investments with unusually large 
pay-offs over the past decades, then our data suggests that the key to becoming rich in Swe-
den over the past decades has been to invest wisely rather than to work hard.  
6  Summary and conclusions 
In this paper, we have studied the evolution of income concentration in Sweden over the 
twentieth century. We have presented new series on top income shares, their composition, as 
well as new data relevant for understanding these developments. We have also tried to put our 
results in international perspective. Our findings suggest that top income shares in Sweden, 
like in many other Western countries, decreased significantly over the first eighty years of the 
century. They did so from levels indicating that Sweden was not more equal than other west-
ern countries at the beginning of the twentieth century. Most of this decrease happened before 
1950, that is, before the expansion of the Swedish welfare state. As in many other countries, 
most of the fall was due to decreasing shares in the very top of the distribution (the top one 
percent), while the income share of the lower half of the top decile (P90–P95) has been ex-
traordinarily stable. Most of the fall is explained by decreased income from capital; however, 
it does not seem likely that this development in the case of Sweden is due only to shocks to 
capital holdings (which has been the suggested explanation in some other countries). Even 
though the crises just after World War I and the financial crises in the early 1930s caused 
drops in both the wealth holdings and the income shares at the top of the income distribution, 
shocks like these do not fully explain the drop. In particular, we note that the Second World 
War had no obvious impact on Swedish top income shares. Instead a very significant drop 
takes place just after the war, at a time when marginal taxes for the top groups had just risen 
sharply. A closer look at the composition of the decrease in top income shares also suggest 
that wage compression was as important as decreased capital incomes between 1935 and 
1951.  
 
Even if the evolution of top income shares in Sweden in many ways resembles that in other 
Western countries over the first eighty years, there are some important differences. Top in-  24
come shares had already by 1950 dropped more in Sweden than in any other country (for 
which comparable data exist), and the further increases in marginal taxes as well as “solidarity 
wage policies” caused them to drop even further in the 1970s. However, the most remarkably 
different aspect in the Swedish data appears over the past decades. During this period, when 
top income shares increased significantly in Anglo-Saxon countries mainly due to wage in-
creases, while they remained virtually unchanged in Continental Europe, the Swedish devel-
opment depends entirely on how capital gains are treated. If we include capital gains Swedish 
top income shares look like the Anglo-Saxon ones, if we do not include capital gains they 
have increased slightly but still resemble the Continental European experience.  
 
Notwithstanding the problems with including capital gains in a study such as this, we believe 
there are good reasons to think that our data does capture a real development in terms of top 
incomes. The main reasons for this include, the exceptional stock market development in 
Sweden since around 1980, the fact that capital gains are consistently concentrated among 
those with high earnings income, suggesting that the high capital gains do not mainly accrue 
to “new individuals” each year, and the fact that the capital gains component in top income 
shares has been important every year over at least a twenty year period. Assuming that top 
income shares have risen due to capital gains over the past decades, the interesting question 
for discriminating between different theories for explaining this increase is to what extent 
these gains are to be seen as part of the compensation for work efforts, or if most of capital 
gains are to be seen as unrelated to job performance. Depending on the answer to such ques-
tions, the Swedish experience over the recent past may be judged as being more similar to the 
U.S. and the U.K. than what is usually assumed, or perhaps as a development different from 
the Anglo-Saxon as well as the Continental European one. One possible interpretation of our 
data is that top income earners in Sweden have not increased their income share over the past 
decades through higher earnings but instead by making the right investments.  
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Income concept appearing in 








Taxable income [till statlig 
inkomstskatt taxerad inkomst]. 
Bascially “Total income”. 
− 
1911–1942 
Taxable amount [Taxerat be-
lopp] = Taxable income (see 
above) + Wealth share (i.e., 
share of taxable personal net 
wealth) − Some taxes. 
Removal of wealth 
shares and after 
1920 addition of 
some municipal 
taxes  
Share of “total personal 
sector income” (from 
National accounts) 
adding estimates of 
items not included in 
the preferred definition 
(1903–1942) 
1943–1950  − 
Adult population 
(>15 yrs) minus 
married women  
(−1951) 
1951–1970 
Total income [Sammanräknad 
nettoinkomst] = Total (gross) 
income − Deficits at source  
Age adjustment 
(excluding all <16 
years old) 
Adult population 
(>15 yrs and above) 
less housewives 
(1951–1971) 
1971–1990  Total (gross) income [Samman-
räknad inkomst] 
Subtracting defi-
cits at source + 
Age adjustment 
1991–2004  Total income [Sammanräknad 
förvärvs- och kapitalinkomst]  Age adjustment 
Tax statistics income 
plus estimates of non-
taxed items included in 
preferred def. (mainly 
corrections for changed 
tax treatment of unem-
ployment and sick pay 
insurance etc. before 
1974) plus estimated 
incomes of “non-filers” 
(1943–2003) 
Adult population 
(>15 yrs) (1971− ) 
Note: All concepts are elaborated upon in the appendices of Roine and Waldenström (2006). No age-specific 
data were available for different income classes until 1951. 











Fractiles  N tax units 
(individuals)






     Full tax pop.  7,350,260 206,726  200,306 
P90  353,927 345,167  P90–95  367,513 394,425  381,380 
P95  450,396 430,427  P95–99  294,010 546,713  515,256 
P99  824,912 711,548 P99–99.9  66,152 1,212,180  938,828 
P99.9  2,400,593 1,569,954 P99.9–99.99  6,615 3,527,589 2,071,425 
P99.99  6,986,015 3,463,936 P99.99–100  735 13,031,444  5,277,839 
Note: The calculations are based on income tax data, with income defined as total income (excluding and includ-
ing capital gains, ranked in classes of total income including capital gains) before individual taxes expressed in 
SEK 2003. See Roine and Waldenström (2006) for more details.  
Table 2: Top income thresholds and average incomes in Sweden 2003.   28
 
   Percentage change in 
   Total income shares  with contribution by... 
     Wages  Capital income  Business income 
P90–95 6.1  8.8  –1.2 –1.4 
P95–99 –9.4 –1.8  –6.3  –1.4 
P99–100 –41.1  –9.1  –23.8  –8.2 
1912–1935 
P99.9–100 –53.0  –7.2 –35.2  –10.6 
P90–95 0.3 –2.6  –4.6  7.5 
P95–99 –10.0 –9.9  –7.6  7.4 
P99–100 –38.6 –16.7  –19.4  –2.5 
1935–1951 
P99.9–100 –56.2  –21.8  –27.0  –7.3 
P90–95 –2.5 11.9  0.7  –15.1 
P95–99 –11.7 11.6  –1.5  –21.8 
P99–100 –36.1  –6.6 –4.9  –24.6 
1951–1980 
P99.9–100 –49.5  –19.8 –5.0  –24.7 
Note: Calculations are based on tax returns data from 1945 onwards and Census data from 1920, 1930, 1935 and 
1945, including estimates of returns to wealth. Business income is calculated as a residual prior to 1951. 
Table 3: Decomposition of changes in Swedish top income shares into wage-, capital- and 




Change in P99 
income share* 
(percentage points) 
Change resulting from changes 
in wealth (assuming factor 
share 0.3, percentage points) 
Change resulting from changes 
in wealth (calculated factor 
shares, percentage points) 
1911–12  1.36 0.52  0.92 
1912–16  7.12 4.36  7.76 
1916–19  –11.70 –2.57  –5.14 
1919–20  –2.85 –0.59  –1.79 
1920–30  0.26 –0.58  –1.29 
1930–34  –1.80 –1.86  –2.01 
1934–35  0.37 0.52  0.76 
1935–41  –2.03 –0.39  –0.17 
1941–51  –3.21 –0.64  –0.60 
1951–91  –1.26 –1.87  –2.44 
Sources: Own calculations based on income and wealth shares reported above. 
* Changes based on the series including capital gains. The calculated change in the P99–100 income share be-
tween 1951 and 1991 is based on an average of the share in 1990–1992 as 1991 is an outlier in the series includ-
ing capital gains (as discussed in Section 3) due to the tax reform.    
Table 4: Contribution of changes in the top income earner’s wealth shares on their income 
shares, 1911-1991.   
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   Coefficient  estimates    
Fractile Model  Constant 0 ˆ () β  Elasticity 1 ˆ () β  Trend 2 ˆ () β   Trend
2
3 ˆ () β   R
2  Pr.>χ
2 







(0.00)  0.79  
P90 







(0.00)  0.77 0.00 







(0.00)  0.88  
P99 







(0.00)  0.88 0.98 







(0.00)  0.92  
P99.9 







(0.00)  0.92 0.87 







(0.00)  0.91  
P99.99 







(0.00)  0.91 0.19 
Notes: OLS regressions use Newey-West standard errors (with 6 lags). The 2SLS instrument the net-of-tax rate 
with the ln(1 – Statutory top marginal tax rate). Tax rates are calculated using laws listed in Söderberg (1996). 
Pr.>χ
2 shows Hausman test of difference between OLS and 2SLS. All regressions have 48 observations. *, **, 
*** denote significance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-levels, respectively. 




  Percentage change in the top percentile income share in... 
Period:  Sweden Australia Canada  France Netherlands  UK  USA 
1939–1945  –4.6  –24.0  –40.1  –43.3 –12.7 –22.7  –25.5 
1946–1951 –27.2  11.4 –0.9 19.4 –11.2 –15.2  –5.3 
Note: For Sweden, we use 1941–1945 since no data exist for 1939. 





























P90-100 incl. cap. gains
P90-100 excl. cap. gains
 
Source: Column 1 in Appendix tables A2 and A3, respectively. 

































P90-95 incl. cap. gains P90-95 excl. cap. gains
P95-99 incl. cap. gains P95-99 excl. cap. gains
P99-100 incl. cap. gains P99-100 excl. cap. gains
 
Source: Columns 3, 8 and 9 in Appendix tables A2 and A3, respectively. 
Figure 2: The P90−95, P95−99 and P99−100 (top 1 percent) income shares (with 




























P99.99-100 incl. cap. gains
P99.99-100 excl. cap. gains
 
Source: Column 7 in Appendix tables A2 and A3, respectively. 
Figure 3: The top 0.01 percent income share (with and without capital gains), 
1903−2004. 
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Total income (incl. cap.gains) P90-99 Total income (excl. cap.gains) P90-99





































Total income (incl. cap.gains) P99-100 Total income (excl. cap.gains) P99-100
Market income (incl. cap.gains) P99-100 Market income (excl. cap.gains) P99-100  
Figure 5: Total income shares vs. market income shares 1950-2004, (panel a, P90-
99; panel b, P99-100). 





















































Capital share of value added/GDP
P99-100
 
Sources: Data on the capital share of value added and GDP by activity come from Edvinsson 
(2005). Top income percentile shares come from Appendix table A2 column 1. 
Figure 6: The capital share of value added as a share of GDP and the top 1 percent 




















































P99-100 (income distribution) P90-99 (income distribution)
P99-100 (wealth distribution) P90-99 (wealth distribution)
P99-100 (income distribution, right axis) P90-99 (income distribution, right axis)
 
Sources: Authors’ own calculations. 




































Source: Tax rates are computed for each top income level in Table A4 using tax tables in Söderberg 
(1996) until 1990. After 1990, we show the “highest marginal tax rate” (Swedish National Tax 
Board, 2004), applying only to labor income (wages + business income). 




















































































Capital gains earned in P90-99
Capital gains earned in P99.9-99.99
Capital gains earned in P99.99-100
Swedish real stock prices (yearly average)
  
Note: Stock prices are yearly averages of end-of-month prices up to 1979 and daily closing prices 
thereafter of Affärsvärldens Generalindex (http://www.affarsvarlden.se), deflated with monthly CPI 
(monthly averages).  
Figure 9: Capital gains in some top income fractiles and Swedish real stock prices, 
1967–2004 






























Note: The figure shows the ratio of P90–95 to P0–90 (col. 8 and one minus col. 1 in Table A2). 






































Australia Sweden (incl. capital gains)
Netherlands Sweden (excl. capital gains)
 
Notes and Sources: Australia (Atkinson and Leigh, 2006), Canada (Saez and Veall, 2005), France 
(Piketty, 2003), Netherlands and the UK (Atkinson and Salverda, 2005) and the US (Piketty and 
Saez, 2003). 
Figure 11: Income shares of the top percentile in Western countries, 1903–2003. 
 